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Abstract. Safety cases embody arguments that demonstrate how safety
properties of a system are upheld. Such cases implicitly document the
barriers that must exist between hazards and vulnerable components of
a system. For safety certification, it is the analysis of these barriers that
provide confidence in the safety of the system.
The explicit representation of hazard barriers can provide additional in-
sight for the design and evaluation of system safety. They can be identi-
fied in a hazard analysis to allow analysts to reflect on particular design
choices. Barrier existence in a live system can be mapped to abstract
barrier representations to provide both verification of barrier existence
and a basis for quantitative measures between the predicted barrier be-
haviour and performance of the actual barrier. This paper explores the
first stage of this process, the binding between explicit mitigation argu-
ments in hazard analysis and the barrier concept. Examples from the
domains of computer-assisted detection in mammography and free route
airspace feasibility are examined and the implications for system certifi-
cation are considered.
1 Introduction
Barriers are often complex socio-technical systems: a combination of technical,
human and organisational measures that prevent or protect against an adverse
effect. Barriers for safety critical systems include physical representations, for
example a mechanical guard on an electronic throttle [1], as well as beliefs, such
as confidence in system safety based on conformance to applied standards. A no
smoking sign is a typical example of a barrier as a complex system. Although
the sign aims to prevent fire from cigarettes, it is not just the sign. The barrier
includes awareness of how smoking may cause fires, awareness of the significance
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2of the sign, the sign’s visibility, training of the smokers, and its relation to other
barrier systems such as an installed smoke alarm and sprinkler system [19].
Barriers embody both abstract and concrete representations of properties
commonly argued in a safety case. Kelly et al. [11] defines a safety case as the
document, or set of documents, presenting the argument that a system is ac-
ceptably safe to operate in a given context. Such cases implicitly document the
barriers that must exist between hazards and hazardous states and vulnerable
components of a system. For certification it is the verification of these barriers
that provide confidence in the safety of the system. However, explicit represen-
tations of such barriers are commonly absent from safety case documentation
and the associated arguments for compliance to particular standards.
Explicit barrier description in hazard analysis can provide insight throughout
the development of safety critical systems and in addition aid safety certification
by documenting barrier development through design to implementation in a live
system. For example if there is a hazard mitigation that an interlock1 inhibits
some type of behaviour, this may feature as evidence in a safety case. It should be
possible to prove that it is in place in the live system and that its performance
can be accessed and compared to predicted performance in the initial hazard
analysis.
This paper investigates the binding of explicit mitigation arguments in hazard
analysis to the barrier concept. Identifying explicit barriers early in system devel-
opment can allow informed decision making through design and implementation
phases of a system’s development. The remainder of this paper is as follows.
Section 2 describes barriers in relation to risk reduction in design and imple-
mentation. Section 3 presents an overview of barriers in the context of hazard
analysis. The use of explicit barriers to highlight hazard and barrier properties
are exemplified in two case studies in Sections 4 and 5. Section 6 overviews the
use of explicit barriers for certification. Section 7 presents conclusions.
2 Risk reduction and barriers
Risk reduction is a key factor in the design of safety critical systems and in as-
sessment of their operational safety. It is achieved either by preventing hazards or
by protecting against hazards. Prevention typically involves design modifications
of the total system, including for example operating procedures. Protection in-
volves the design of additional systems, which embody barriers that fend against
adverse events, damage or harm [19]. Barriers represent the diverse physical and
organisational measures that are taken to prevent a target from being affected
by a potential hazard [10, pg 359]. A barrier is an obstacle, an obstruction, or
a hindrance that may either (i) prevent an action from being carried out or an
event from taking place, or (ii) prevent or lessen the impact of the consequences,
limiting the reach of the consequences or weakening them in some way [9].
1 An interlock is a mechanism which ensures that potentially hazardous actions are
only performed at times when they are safe [22].
3The concepts and terminology related to barriers or safety features vary
considerably [7], for example Hollnagel [9] presents a classification of barrier
systems based on four main categories:
1. Material barriers physically prevent an action from being carried out or the
consequences of a hazard from spreading. For example a fence or wall.
2. Functional barriers impede an action from being carried out, for instance
the use of an interlock.
3. Symbolic barriers require an act of interpretation in order to achieve their
purpose. For example a give way sign indicates a driver should give way but
does not actively enforce/stop non-compliance.
4. Immaterial barriers are not physically present or represented in the situa-
tion, but depend on the knowledge of the user to achieve their purpose. For
example the use of standards.
This paper makes no commitment to the terminology of barriers and in-
stead focuses on the presence of barriers, in whatever form, in the context of a
hazardous event or action. The pre- and post-condition states of a hazard are
represented by preventive and protective barriers respectively. Therefore the use
of barriers, either for the prevention of hazards or the protection from hazardous
effect, is considered to be part of the process of hazard analysis.
3 Hazard analysis and barriers
Hazard analysis is at the heart of any safety programme [13, pg 287]. It is a
necessary first step before hazards can be eliminated or controlled through design
or operational procedures. Within hazard analysis, descriptive arguments2 are
implicitly used to justify prevention arguments of identified hazards.
Previous work has demonstrated that explicit mitigation arguments allow
an analyst to reflect on the mitigations present and constitute an initial step to
processes such as argument reuse in hazard analysis [20, 21]. In addition, explicit
arguments document the reasoning being applied in an analysis session. If such
decisions are lost, evaluation of the analysis and certification can be problematic.
Mitigation arguments to hazards are implicitly described in terms of bar-
riers. Barriers against hazards may take a variety of forms for example proce-
dures, training, human action, as well as, systems and components that prevent
accidents or provide mitigation of consequences and constitute barriers against
injury [14, pg A-1].
Although a range of methods have been developed to support systematic
hazard analysis, for example, HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Studies) [12],
FMEA (Failure Modes and Effect Analysis) [3] and THEA (Technique for Human
Error Assessment) [15], such methods stop short of explicitly defining barriers.
The explicit representation of barriers is a step towards defining a semantics of
2 Descriptive arguments can be considered as informal arguments in contrast to more
quantitative, numeric arguments.
4safety arguments and allows analysts to reflect on the hazards being mitigated
and the associated implications for design and implementation of safe systems
so that risk reduction techniques can be more effectively implemented.
In Sections 4 and 5, two existing hazard analyses will be examined and the ex-
plicit barriers inherent in the analysis identified. Barrier implications are drawn
out and areas of concern for both the hazard analysis and any associated design
are highlighted. The case studies are the proposed design of a computer-aided
detection tool (CADT) for mammography and the feasibility of eight-state free
route airspace.
4 Computer-aided mammography example
The UK Breast Screening Programme is a national service that involves a number
of screening clinics, each with two or more radiologists. Initial screening tests are
by mammography, where one or more X-ray films (mammograms) are taken by
a radiographer. Each mammogram is then examined for evidence of abnormality
by two experienced radiologists [8]. A decision is then made as to whether to
recall a patient for further tests because there is suspicion of cancer [23]. Within
the screening process it is desirable to achieve the minimum number of false
positives (FPs), so that fewer women are recalled for further tests unnecessarily,
and the maximum true positive (TP) rate, so that few cancers will be missed [8].
Unfortunately the radiologists’ task is a difficult one because the small number
of cancers is hidden among a large number of normal cases. Also the use of two
experienced radiologists, for double readings, makes this process labour intensive.
Computer-based image analysis techniques are being explored to enable a
single radiologist to achieve performance that is equivalent or similar to that
achieved by double readings [2, 8]. Computer-aided detection systems can provide
radiologists with a useful “second opinion” [24]. The case study in this section
involves the introduction of a CADT as an aid in screening mammograms. When
a CADT is used, the radiologist initially views the mammogram and records a
recall decision. The CADT marks a digitised version of the X-ray film with
“prompts” that the radiologist should examine. The proposed procedure is that
the radiologist records a decision before looking at the CADT prompted x-ray
film. A final decision on a patient’s recall is then taken by the human radiologist
based on the original decision and the examination of the marked-up X-ray. A
summary of this process can be seen in Figure 1 (from [23]).
A system based on the model shown in Figure 1 has been investigated to
identify the undesirable consequences that may arise. An incorrect recall deci-
sion resulting from a misdiagnosis of cancer is an example of such an consequence.
The general argument for safe use involves a number of argument legs covering
three main activities namely (i) human analysis of the X-ray, (ii) CADT anal-
ysis of the X-ray and (iii) the recall decision by the human, based on a review
of their original analysis and the CADT analysis. A HAZOP [12] style analysis
for the system was completed by a team including the authors [21]. HAZOP is
described as a technique of imaginative anticipation of hazards and operation
5Fig. 1. Model for person using computerised aid for reading mammograms in breast
screening.
problems [16, pg43]. It is a systematic technique that attempts to consider events
in a system or process exhaustively. The output from this process was a HA-
ZOP table summarising cause, consequence and protection relations to hazards
identified in the proposed system (see Table 3 in Appendix A for four example
HAZOP rows).
The CADT HAZOP contained 105 HAZOP rows and 61 hazards that re-
quired mitigation. In total 99 barriers were identified in the mitigation arguments
of the 61 identified hazards. Typical implied barriers included human oriented
barriers such as “staff training”, environmental conditions, for example “room
layout”, and system components, for example “bar codes on x-rays”. The barri-
ers were identified through the examination of the mitigation arguments present
in the HAZOP. Each barrier was considered independent as validating true inde-
pendence between the associated mitigation arguments is non-trivial and outside
the scope of this paper. By examining these barriers further insight into the im-
plications of the hazard mitigation can be derived in the context of the proposed
system. The following sections present several views on the nature of barriers
identified in post HAZOP analysis. However, it should be noted that these are
not necessarily an exhaustive set of the barrier properties or implications for
safety.
4.1 Preventive vs. protective barriers
It is common for hazard mitigations to be considered in terms of independence
and diversity. The belief that a hazard has been mitigated may be given a higher
level of confidence if multiple diverse arguments are present. Also the nature of
the associated barrier in the context of the initiating hazard event is also of
relevance. Classifying preventive and protective barriers highlights this consid-
eration. For example if a hazard has only preventive barriers there is no fault
tolerance in the system, as provided by protective barriers.
In the mammography analysis there are 7 examples of protective barriers and
92 examples of preventive barriers. Two of the protective barriers and 15 of the
preventive barriers are unique. Therefore the majority of the barrier protection
in this system is based on preventive barriers. This has implications for the
6fault tolerance of the system as the failure of preventive barriers may lead to a
potentially hazardous system state not anticipated by the designers.
4.2 Barrier frequency and type
Commonly there is not a one-to-one relation between hazards and barriers. One
hazard may be protected against by several barriers (see Section 4.3) and one
barrier may feature in the mitigation arguments of several hazards. A barrier
mitigation with a number of high consequence hazards will require greater reli-
ability as more of the system safety will be dependent on it. This is particularly
the case if a single barrier is the only defence to a hazard (see Section 4.3). In ad-
dition there may be cost-benefit tradeoffs between barriers. Expensive barriers,
in terms of physical cost, time to implement and/or ongoing maintenance, that
provide protection against a single hazard may be less desirable than alternative
barrier solutions that provide protection from multiple hazards. Such knowledge
can provide justification for particular design decisions.
Table 1. Eight most common barriers in the mammography analysis
Barrier Frequency Barrier Frequency
Staff training 23 Good practice following 19
CADT reliability 12 Timetable enforcement 7
Safety culture 6 Bar codes on x-rays 6
User experience 6 CADT testing 5
Table 1 shows the eight most common barriers in the mammography analysis.
The top two most common barriers are human oriented and together contribute
42% of the barriers for this example. This may seem surprising considering this
system is a technology based solution to a labour intensive process. Even in this
computer-based system there is reliance on appropriate training in the mitigation
of hazards. Also these human oriented barriers operate when the system is live
and are therefore prone to performance variation and other human-error issues
(see [17]). Technology based barriers, e.g. “CADT reliability”, “bar codes on
x-rays” and “CADT testing”, contribute 23% of the barriers. From a total of
17 unique barriers identified in the hazard analysis, barriers in the top eight
represent 85% of the total barriers. Identifying the barriers that have the most
impact can allow developers to focus their efforts.
In addition to the occurrence of particular barriers in this case study, the
frequency of demand of barriers significantly modifies the predicted risk. Expec-
tations on how often a barrier will be expected to be active, and not fail, will
determine how critical it is to the system it is protecting. However, the analysis
material discussed in this paper does not provide details of such expectations
and will therefore not be discussed here further.
74.3 Barriers per hazard
Accidents happen because barriers fail and hazards are present. Hollnagel [9]
observes that accidents are frequently characterised in terms of the events and
conditions that led to the final outcome or in terms of the barriers that have
failed. As a consequence, redundancy is a common feature in the safety aspects
of dependable systems. In particular, redundancy is used to prevent the failure of
a single component causing the failure of a complete system - a so-called single-
point failure [22, pg 132]. Identifying potential single-point failures is essential
for determining problem areas in a system’s reliability. Hazards with only single
barriers, and in particular single preventive barriers, represent a significant threat
to system safety. In addition, identifying multiple barriers does not necessarily
imply greater prevention or tolerance properties. Barrier interdependence will
compromise any diversity based arguments if combined dependability between
barriers results in single-point failure situations. A common preventive barrier
pair in the mammography example is the use of “staff training” and “good
procedure following” which are clearly interrelated.
In the mammography analysis 33 hazards are protected against by single
barriers, 14 hazards by double barriers, 12 hazards by triple barriers and 2
hazards by quadruple barriers. Therefore 54% of the barriers in this analysis
suffer from potential single-point failures. Of the single-point failure barriers 5
are protective barriers and 29 are preventive barriers. This reinforces the barrier
bias demonstrated in Section 4.1. In this case the additional 2 protective barriers
examples are double barriers with, the same, one protective (“bar codes on x-
ray”) and one preventive (“good procedure following”) barrier each. In this case
independence can be observed informally between a technology based barrier
and a human oriented barrier. There is a need to determine such independence
if accurate predictions of barrier performance are to be generated.
5 Airspace route feasibility example
Eurocontrol’s European Air Traffic Management Programme requires a safety
assessment to be performed for “all new systems and changes to existing sys-
tems.”[5]. Therefore a safety assessment was commissioned for the eight-states3
free route airspace concept. The overriding aim of the concept was to obtain
benefits in terms of safety, capacity, flexibility and flight efficiency by removing
the constraints imposed by the fixed route structure and by optimising the use
of more airspace [6, pg xiii]. The principal safety objective was to ensure that
free route airspace operations are at least as safe as the current fixed route oper-
ations. A functional hazard assessment was completed to determine how safe the
various functions of the system need to be in order to satisfy the safety policy
requirements. This assessment investigated each function of the proposed system
and identified ways in which it could fail (i.e. the hazards) [6, pg 10].
3 Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway and
Sweden.
8This hazard assessment has been examined in a similar manner to that de-
scribed in Section 4 (see Table 4 in Appendix A for three example hazard as-
sessment rows). Although the two cases are not directly comparable, examining
the explicit barriers present in the airspace route provides insight into the iden-
tification of barriers as both a design tool and possible analysis metric. Analysis
is based on the mitigations associated with the new hazards introduced by the
implementation of free route operations and ignores existing mitigations in the
previous system.
The functional hazard assessment contains 105 rows of which 69 contained
new hazards that required mitigation. Newly identified hazards are not mitigated
by existing mitigating factors in the system. The output of the hazard assess-
ment was a set of safety requirements for the proposed free route environment.
In total 128 barriers can be identified in the safety requirements. For example
assessment 210 in Table 4 of Appendix A contains four existing mitigating fac-
tors and four proposed barriers described as safety requirements. Other implied
barriers in this case study include human oriented barriers such as “controller
training”, environmental conditions, for example “airspace design”, and system
components, for example “MTCD4 system usage”. The following sections are
indicative of the set of barrier properties and of their implications for safety.
5.1 Preventive vs. protective barriers
No protective barriers and 128 preventive barriers were identified in the free
route airspace example. The majority consist of the enforcement or review of
different operating procedures. Other barriers include controller and pilot train-
ing and monitoring system technology. Twenty two different preventive barriers
can be identified as unique barrier forms. All of the barrier protection is based
on preventive barriers here, which has implications for the fault tolerance of the
system.
5.2 Barrier frequency and type
Table 2 shows the eight most common barriers in the airspace analysis. The
two barriers that appear most common in the hazard analysis are technological
systems and together contribute 39% of the barriers. In Table 2 technological
systems represent 48% of the total barriers and the human oriented barriers
represent 24%. From a total of 22 unique barriers identified in the analysis,
those in Table 2 represent 84% of all the barriers in this hazard analysis.
5.3 Barriers per hazard
In this analysis 28 hazards are protected against by single barriers, 31 hazards
by double barriers, 10 hazards by triple barriers and 3 hazards by quadruple
barriers. Therefore 22% of the barriers in this analysis suffer from potential
4 Medium Term Conflict Detection.
9Table 2. Eight most common barriers in the airspace analysis
Barrier Frequency Barrier Frequency
MONA (MONitoring Aid) system 32 MTCD system 18
Controller training 18 Free Route Airspace 15
contingency procedures
Airspace design 8 Review procedures 8
Transfer procedure 5 Area Proximity Warning 4
(APW) system
single-point failures. Although this is less than in the CADT for mammography
example it represents a considerably percentage of the barriers proposed in this
assessment. As with the CADT analysis (see Section 4), each barrier was con-
sidered independent and determining independence between barriers is outside
the scope of this paper.
6 Explicit barriers for certification
Storey [22] notes three typical aspects to the certification of safety-critical sys-
tems:
1. A demonstration that all important hazards have been identified and dealt
with, and that the integrity of the system is appropriate for the application.
2. Evidence of compliance with some particular standard.
3. A rigorous argument to support the claim that the system is sufficiently safe
and will remain so throughout its life.
Explicit barrier definition through the development phases of a safety-critical
system form a traceable hazard mitigation link in the associated documentation.
Barriers identified via hazard analysis will require representation in any design
rationale and associated safety case used to assure system safety. In addition
whether hazard mitigations, as represented by abstract barriers in a design, are
in fact present and functioning in a live system can be determined. Therefore
the explicit representation of barriers highlights the hazard mitigations that are
in place and their continuing performance.
There is little information on final implementation and performance of the
case studies described in this paper. However, they can be examined in the
context of the proposed designs. This allows designers to reflect on the identified
barriers and their influence on any future certification.
User training as a preventive barrier has played a considerable part in the
mitigation of hazards in both the CADT for mammography and the free route
airspace examples. Verification that appropriately qualified staff are part of the
human-machine system would therefore be required. This may require the in-
troduction of additional barriers, such as qualification checking, confirmation of
accreditation of training schemes and continuous assessment of actual perfor-
mance.
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The majority of barriers in the free route airspace example were based on
the development and implementation of future products, for example, the review
and definition of good operating procedures in particularly hazardous situations
and the deployment of proposed traffic monitoring technology. It is likely that
these barriers would feature predominantly in any safety case based in part on
this hazard assessment. Verification of the existence of these procedures and their
acceptance in the organisational structure of the domain would be required. Also
the barriers indicating the use of the new traffic monitoring technology (MONA)
provides a minimum level of functionality for the deployed system. Therefore the
performance between any predicted barrier behaviour, commonly presented as
evidence as part of a safety case, and the actual barrier behaviour in the live
system can provide a quantitative measure of barrier reliability for certification
purposes.
7 Conclusions
Barriers are important for the understanding and prevention of accidents and are
an intrinsic part of safety-critical systems. They feature implicitly throughout a
system’s development life-cycle. In additional to having physical presense in a
live system, they provide a representation for safety concerns in hazard analysis,
design decisions, safety case construction and certification.
In this paper several views on the explicit representation of barriers have
been presented. These aid the understanding of hazards as represented in the
analysis of safety-critical systems. Reflecting on the choice and nature of barriers
is an essential part of constructing more dependable systems. Two case studies
have been examined and the implication of barriers in the context of a hazard
analysis have been defined. The process of hazard mitigation in a design can be
documented by considering barriers explicitly. In addition, this process provides
a framework for a quantitative measure of barriers as part of the certification
process.
Analysing and defining barrier descriptions is a time consuming process which
would be aided considerably by a barrier notation and tool support. The authors
are currently investigating the use of the Hazard-Barrier-Target model [18] and
the Safety Modelling Language [19] as the next step to incorporating explicit
barriers in safety-critical system development. This is ongoing work.
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A Raw hazard analysis fragments
Table 3. Fragment of HAZOP for the CADT for mammography design
Ref Item Guideword Cause Consequence/Implication Indication/Protection
1.1.1a Make initial decision Wrong Radiologist inexperience Wrong detection result Training
...
1.1.1.1g Examine x-ray Repeat X-rays out of order Mixed up detection and Barcoding on x-ray and
patient record patient record. Srict procedure
...
1.2a Process digital x-ray Omit System failure No CADT image. CADT reliability
Reliance on human decision
...
1.3.3a Record decision Omit Operator lapse Loss of records Interlock to force form
completion
Table 4. Fragment of safety assessment for the free route airspace concept
Task Function ID Failure Operational Existing mitigating Proposed Free Route
Condition Consequences factors safety requirement
Handling Conflict 210 Controller fails Potential Controller training. Pilot MTCDa.
aircraft identification to identify conflict collision risk awareness of other Controller training.
traffic. STCAb, TCASc Airspace design.
Procedure review.
Handling Conflict 211 Controller unable to Potential Controller training. Pilot MTCD. Airspace design.
aircraft identification make timely collision risk awareness of other traffic Controller training.
identification of conflict STCA, TCAS. Transfer procedures
Handling Conflict 212 Controller mistakenly Extra workload Controller training. Traffic MTCD.
aircraft identification identifies conflict monitoring Controller training.
when none existed
a Medium Term Conflict Detection system.
b Short Term Conflict Alert system.
c Traffic Alert Collision Avoidance System.
